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Abstract
This paper measures the potential of land to generate income and establishes the contexts
under which access to land can reduce poverty.  Household data gathered in 1997 from
the Mexican poverty alleviation program (PROGRESA) suggest that the marginal
welfare value of land depends on both the complementary assets and contextual settings
of the poor.  Using non-parametric regression methods to estimate and graphically
explore the relationship between land and welfare, we find that for small farmers, an
additional hectare of land will increase welfare by as much as 1000 monthly pesos. Our
results suggest that in areas with good infrastructure, land can be an important element
of a poverty reducing strategy.
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I.  Introduction
Rural poverty reduction strategies have traditionally emphasized land reform and
integrated rural development programs as means of increasing the assets of the poor (de
Janvry and Sadoulet 2001). These approaches assume that chronic poverty is a direct
consequence of land tenure arrangements, which limit the access of poor to land.  Land
reform programs however, have met with limited success, and recent literature calls into
question the importance of land as a poverty-reducing instrument (López and Valdés
2000).  Yet, there is an absence of convincing empirical evidence that measures the
potential of land to generate income, particularly when we consider differences in other
productive assets.
Several empirical studies have documented a positive association between land and
incomes (see Scott (2000) for Chile; Gunning et. al (2000) for Zimbabwe; Grootaert,
Kanbur and Oh (1997) for Cote d’Ivoire; Bouis and Haddad (1990) for Philippines;
Carter and May (1999) for South Africa).  However in many cases, this positive
association actually translates into small welfare gains.  McCulloch and Baulch (2000)
simulate the impact of a policy giving two hectares of land to households in rural
Pakistan with less than this amount to find that it has virtually no effect on income
poverty.  López and Valdés (2000) find in a recent series of case studies in Latin America
that the income generating potential of land is also quite small.  They estimate income to
land elasticities that suggest that landholdings in rural areas of Colombia would have to
quadruple in order for the poorest 40% of the farm households to reach just the poverty
line.3
Although the results will vary by case study, in general the empirical literature has
ignored three important methodological considerations when measuring the marginal
value of land.  First, previous studies often assume a linear specification for the
estimation of the income equation.  This assumption can be overly restrictive when
constraints on a household’s ability to effectively utilize its assets induce a nonlinear
relationship between land endowments and welfare.  We use nonparametric techniques to
graphically explore this possibility.  Second, incomes from agricultural activities tend to
be very noisy and a poor measure of household welfare.  We compare an alternative
measure of welfare that captures the multidimensionality of poverty.  Finally, differences
across households in both their asset positions and exposure to market imperfections
demonstrate that the return to land is significantly affected by limits on the effective
utilization of land and other assets.  In measuring the return to land, it is important to
account for the high degree of heterogeneity in income generating strategies across poor
rural households.
Household data gathered in 1997 from the Mexican poverty alleviation program
(PROGRESA) suggest that the marginal welfare value of land depends on both the
complementary assets and contextual settings of the poor.  Ethnicity is an important
social asset as the marginal value of land for non-indigenous households is on average
twice as high as is for indigenous households.  In general, land has a high but decreasing
marginal return for endowments of less than three hectares and a constant return for land
sizes larger than three hectares.  In effect, the marginal value of land for households with
less than one hectare is almost 8 times higher than that for households possessing more
than three hectares of land.  These results are consistent with the theory that small4
landowners with low opportunity costs of labor exhibit a higher reservation price for land
(see Carter and May (1999) and Carter and Mesbah (1993)).
This paper also contributes to the broader debate on the role of land as a valuable
poverty-reducing instrument.  For land to be an effective instrument, it must be part of an
integrated policy that focuses on not only access to land, but on improving the
complementary assets of the poor, such as education.  In addition, such a policy must
seek to reduce deficits in public goods investments, institutional gaps, and policy
distortions that limit a household’s effective utilization of these assets.  In rural Mexico
where labor opportunities are few and education levels low, we find that the marginal
value of land is highest for households with more education and better access to markets.
It is important to recognize that with rural households pursuing a multitude of economic
activities, gained access to just a small amount of land can have a large welfare effect.
We find that for small farmers, an additional hectare of land will increase welfare
substantially.
The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 of the paper derives our
estimative income equation and explores a microeconomic household model for
conditions that imply a nonlinear relationship between welfare and land.  In section 3, we
explain the semiparametric estimation of the income equation. The data are described in
section 4, including a discussion on our welfare measure and the structure of
landholdings in Mexico. The empirical results follow in section 5, and we conclude the
paper in section 6.5
II.  Theoretical Framework: Derivation of the income equation
In this section we derive the specification of our income equation from the
maximization of standard agrarian household production model.  We present a model
with multiple market imperfections to investigate how these distortions affect the
economic return to land.
Our theoretical framework borrows from the work of Carter and Mesbah (1993) and
it assumes three important frictions: 1) Land arrangements are ignored and land is treated
as exogenous 2) Households face the possibility of off-farm unemployment 3) Access to
credit increases with land size.
Under these assumptions, consider a household that generates income by cultivating
agricultural land, in addition to possibly supplying labor at an exogenously determined
market wage, w.  The household is endowed with T hectares of land, and L hours of labor
per year that are employed in on-farm agricultural work ( f L ), and/or off-farm activities
( s L ).  The household cultivates a single crop using X kilograms of inputs per hectare,
purchased at a per unit market price of q.  The crop can be sold at an exogenous market
price p.  Let ) ; , , ( z T X L F f  represent a constant return to scale production function, where
z represents the set of household and village characteristics that affect the return on
productive assets; such as human and social capital or access to markets.  Let
) ( s L W denote the number of days employed as a function of labor supplied,  s L , where
0 , 0 £ W¢ ¢ > W¢ .  Let  ) (T G denote the amount of working capital available to a household,
at an interest rate i and with land endowment, T.  The cost of production, qX , must be6
financed by the sum of initial wealth K, wage income ) ( s L wW , and available capital
) (T G .
Formally, the household chooses time allocation and purchased inputs to maximize its
income:
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If (*) denotes solution values of the choice variables that maximize the program above,
then the income equation associated with profit maximizing behavior can be specified as
follows,
) , , , , , , ( ) ( ) ( ) ; , , (
* * * * z T K w i q p T i L w qX z T X L pF Y s f L = G - W + - = . (2)
The income equation is a function of prices, household’s endowment of productive
assets, and any characteristic that affects the return to these assets.  We can differentiate
equation (2) to see how an increase in landholdings changes household income,
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If households face the same opportunity costs of labor and inputs, and capital markets are
perfect, then the terms in the parentheses are identically zero and the marginal value of
land is simply equal to the value of its marginal product, i.e.  T dT
dY pF = .  Moreover, if we
assume constant returns to scale, then the marginal return to land is constant for all land
endowments.7
Conversely, with imperfections in labor and input markets, an increase in
landholdings has both a direct and an indirect effect on income. In addition to directly
increasing production, more land decreases the allocation distortions of the production
inputs by increasing their productivity.   For instance, in poor rural areas characterized by
thin labor markets, an increase in household land will increase the marginal product value
of its labor and reduce the difference between its shadow wage and the market wage. If as
Eswaran and Kotwal (1986) suggest, larger farms have better access to credit, then an
increase in landholdings will increase the use of variable inputs and reduce the distortion
in the input markets as well.  With market distortions, we expect the marginal value of
land to vary with land endowments, and quite possibly in a nonlinear manner.
For better insight into how imperfections in land, labor and credit market affect
land’s potential to generate income, we simulate the model above with specific functional
forms and a rough parameterization, given our data.
1
                                               
1 See the appendix for the exact specification of the model.8
 
































































































































































































The results of the simulation are presented in Figure 1.  The top panel displays the
relationship between income and land for both perfect and imperfect markets. When
markets are perfect, landless households must work entirely off-farm and earn a monthly
income of 1280 pesos.  With access to a hectare of land, household income will increase
by the marginal value of land, 228 pesos, as the household adjusts its labor allocation
between working its land and off-farm employment.  In the presence of market
imperfections, the mapping of land to income shifts downward and is no longer linear.
The curve intercepts the y-axis at 768 pesos: the expected wage rate when faced with9
possible unemployment. With distortions in the labor market, the marginal value of land
is high for small farmers since another plot of land will also increase their shadow wage.
As land endowments increase and the household can allocate its labor more effectively,
the marginal return to land declines.  Around four hectares, as access to credit improves,
the marginal value of land begins to increase.  A household’s inability to generate
sufficient economic livelihood depends not only on its land endowments but also on its
ability to effectively utilize the amount of land it does possess.
To estimate the marginal value of land, as depicted in Figure 1, a linear
approximation to the income equation can be an overly restrictive assumption.  Without
knowing the underlying frictions of our environment and hence the relationship between
land and income, we relax the functional form for land completely and explore the
mapping with nonparametric estimation techniques.
III.  Econometric specification of the income equation
This section outlines the semiparametric procedure for estimating the relationship
between income and land endowments.  Our production model implies that any
characteristic that affects the return to the productive assets of the household should
influence the household’s income.  This list includes household demographics,
constraints on factor use, as well as regional and village factors that capture employment
opportunities and market integration.  Although a fully nonparametric specification of the
income equation would best capture its underlying shape, with several possible covariates
the computation cost of this technique is prohibitively high.
2  A semiparametric
                                               
2  With k explanatory variables and a sample size of N observations, to evaluate the density on a k-
dimensional grid of G points, requires 
k NG evaluations (Deaton 1997).  Even with the semiparametric
approach, the income equation took over 8 hours to estimate.10
procedure allows us to relax the functional form on land and still control for the other
factors that determine household income.  Following Robinson (1988), we estimate a
model of the following form,
e b a + + + = ) (z g x y   (4)
where x of dimension n x k is the set of controls and z of dimension n x 1 is the land
endowment of the household.  The variable y represents some measure of household
welfare. The constant term is denoted by a  and b  is a kx1 vector of our parameters of
interest.  The error term,e , is distributed normally.  We assume that the functional form
of  ) (￿ g is unknown and  0 ) , | ( = z x E e .  Taking expectations of equation (4) conditional
on z, we get
) ( ) | ( ) | ( z g z x E z y E + + = b a .  (5)
Subtracting (5) from (4) yields
e b + - = - )] | ( [ ) | ( z x E x z y E y .  (6)
With nonparametric estimates of  ) | ( z y E  and  ) | ( z x E , we can then estimate (6) by
ordinary least squares to get a b ˆ , that is  n -consistent, asymptotically normal, and
robust to any unknown form of  ) (z g .
3  The estimator for  ) (z g  is simply
                                               
3  Both ) | ( z y E  and  ) | ( z x E  are estimated using Cleveland (1979) robust locally weighed regression
(LOWESS) technique.  LOWESS estimates are calculated using weighted least squares within a defined
neighborhood around the independent variable z.  Computationally, the estimates are calculated as follows.
The data is ordered so that  i i z z £ -1  for  1 ,..., 1 - = N i .  Each observation  ] , [ + - ˛ i i j , where
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) ˆ ) | ( ( ) | ( ) ( ˆ b a z x E z y E z g + - = . (7)
There are two important features to note about this procedure.  First, since b ˆ
converges at a rate of n  and  ) ( ˆ z g  converges at a slower rate of  nh (where h is the
bandwidth size), the estimation of b  does not affect the asymptotic distribution of
) ( ˆ X g .  Second, a constant term cannot be identified independently of  ) ( ˆ z g .
IV.  Data
In this section we describe the data underlying the analysis and briefly characterize
the landowners in our sample.  Land and welfare are positively correlated.  Larger
farmers, on average, have higher monthly household income, consume more, and have a
lower incidence of poverty.  We also describe the welfare index that we construct and use
in the analysis to follow.
The data for this study come from the 1997-1998 surveys conducted for the Mexican
rural poverty alleviation program, PROGRESA.  The program covers approximately
25,000 households over 500 localities and 7 states.  A stratified randomization procedure
selected the localities and every household within each locality was included in the
sample.  The data are available at the individual, household and locality levels, with
detailed information on schooling, consumption and employment patterns of the
household.
Land Endowments
Since the PROGRESA program targets marginalized rural communities 52% of
households in our sample are classified as poor.  Consequently, only 54% of the sample
                                                                                                                                           
The smooth value of the dependent variable is the weighted regression prediction (STATA 1999).  This12
possesses land, and the average farm size is less than 2.7 hectares.  Of the 97% that are
used for agriculture, 90% of the land cultivates corn.
The rental market is very inactive with less than 4% of land rented-in (see Table
1).  Unfortunately, the data is unclear as to the proportion of farmers who rent-out but we
suspect this percentage is also small.  An ejido community exists in 60% of the localities
in our sample.  This may explain some of the inactivity in the land rental market since
until recently land transactions were prohibited in all ejido sectors.  With few data on
land transactions, we consider only household property and make the important
assumption that land is exogenous.
4
With data on both rainfed and irrigated types of land, we convert plot size into
hectares of rainfed corn equivalence (RFE).  The average yield of corn for both irrigated
and rainfed land is calculated for each locality and normalized by the sample average
yield of rainfed corn.
5  A household’s endowment of land in hectares of rainfed corn
equivalence is then the weighted sum of its rainfed and irrigated landholdings, where the
normalized averages are used as the appropriate weights (de Janvry, Gordillo, Sadoulet
1997).  By normalizing farm size by it yield, this adjustment incorporates an imperfect
measure of land quality, a variable that is typically hard to observe.
                                                                                                                                           
procedure is computed at every value of z using a bandwidth of 0.8.
4 We test this assumption in our estimation of the income equation.
5 Since the data do not provide the percentage of the land used for corn production, the yield was averaged
over only the households that produced strictly corn.  In averaging by locality, if the number of
observations was less than 30, we then averaged at the municipality level.  Also these averages did not
include crop failures, which for rainfed is a yield of less than .2 and irrigated a yield of less than .8.13
Table 1: Average farm sizes by land and ownership type
All <1 1-2 2-5 >5 Distribution of tenure type (%)
Distribution of farms (%) 100 30 28 28 14




















































































































* Denotes less than 10 observations.  Standard deviations are in parentheses.
Table 2 characterizes the households in our sample by farm size measured in RFE
hectares.  On average, off-farm income (agricultural wages, nonagricultural wages, and
other labor wages) accounts for over 61% of total household income.  For households
with at most one RFE hectare, off-farm income represents over 68% of their total income.
This percentage decreases to 52% for larger farmers, although income due to
nonagricultural wages increases.  An important difference in income between the largest
farmers and households with less than a RFE hectare is the amount of non-labor transfers,
which on average is almost twice as much for the former.   Patterns in the income data
are consistent with occupational choice.  As farm sizes increase, households substitute14
off-farm agricultural employment for working their own farm.   Consumption
expenditure also follows a similar pattern as income.
Household size and the age of the household head are positively correlated with
larger landholdings. While the education of the household head is not associated with
land size, average education in the household does increase with farm size, which may
suggest that families with more land are better suited to invest in the human capital of
their children.  Indigenous households tend to own less land.
Table 2. Household characteristics by farm size
Farm size in rain-fed equivalent hectares 1 £ 1-2 2-5 5 ‡ All
Number of households 4,311 4,108 4,013 3,273 15,705
Total income in pesos 1083.39 1115.95 1281.75 1489.83 1208.37
Total labor income 883.74 897.36 986.38 1115.22 950.69
   Agricultural wages 521.89 500.66 466.29 445.38 489.09
   Nonagricultural wages 220.87 225.61 265.73 329.61 250.92
   Self-employment 100.31 116.87 149.63 172.03 129.35
   Family-related business 35.98 47.54 94.34 149.89 72.45
   Other labor wages 3.29 5.20 7.77 11.95 6.36
Non-labor transfers 199.65 218.58 295.37 374.61 257.68
Total monthly expenditure in pesos 640.64 700.20 817.66 903.18 744.82
   Food expenditures 467.0 499.58 565.70 612.21 524.74
   Nonfood expenditures 173.64 200.62 251.96 290.97 220.08
Number of workers per household
Agricultural workers 0.91 0.89 0.78 0.72 0.84
Nonagricultural workers 0.22 0.21 0.24 0.23 0.22
Seller 0.24 0.28 0.27 0.27 0.26
Family-related business 0.34 0.43 0.61 0.73 0.50
Household characteristics
Household size 5.63 6.06 6.17 6.13 5.97
Number of adult equivalent persons 5.12 5.55 5.75 5.76 5.51
Number of children 1.56 1.70 1.72 1.67 1.66
Maximum education in household 5.46 5.95 6.27 6.62 6.00
Mean level of education in household 2.57 2.80 3.07 3.32 2.88
Head of household characteristics
Education 2.46 2.48 2.49 2.48 2.48
Age 46.85 47.62 50.59 52.85 49.00
Male 0.91 0.92 0.92 0.93 0.91
Indigenous 0.51 0.45 0.32 0.28 0.41
Figure 2 provides more evidence on the correlation between land and welfare.  The
association between land and the poverty indicator is quite striking.  Among those15
households with less than one RFE hectare, 62% are poor.  This proportion drops to only


























































Figure 2: Poverty and land
6
Welfare index
What is the best measure of welfare is a topic of much debate.  Income, which is
sensitive to volatile shocks, can be a poor indicator of long-term welfare for households
predominately involved in agricultural and self-employed labor activities.  With the
possibility of households smoothing their consumption across time by borrowing, saving,
and mutual insurance, consumption measures are considered much more reliable and
more theoretically sound (Deaton 1997).  Yet, both of these monetary-based measures
fail to capture the multidimensionality of poverty, and in effect neglect important
indicators of welfare, such as, access to sanitation, access to water, and adequate shelter.
 With these concerns, we construct a welfare index consisting of various dwelling
characteristics (running water, electricity, has a bathroom, number of rooms, and dirt
                                               
6 Each point represents 137 observations.16
floors), household durables (ownership of a blender, refrigerator, television, truck), in
addition to the short-term measures of consumption expenditure and labor income. We
aggregate these various indicators of poverty using principal component techniques.
Figure 3 plots the joint density of the welfare index and landholdings measured in
RFE.
7  The welfare index appears normally distributed with a mean at 0.05 welfare units.
The figure also illustrates that the mass of the land distribution is predominately located
below 5 RFE hectares.  Without having controlled for the other determinants of welfare,
the figure however, does not depict a clear correlation between land and welfare.
Figure 3: Joint distribution of welfare and land
                                               
7 The joint density is computed using a bivariate Epanechnikov kernel with a bandwidth of 1.17
For a better sense of this welfare index, Table 3 displays the average of various
household characteristics by its quintiles.  There is a consistent positive relationship
between assets (land, farm animals, household education level), income, consumption
and welfare. Households in the highest quintile earn approximately 2.2 times as much as
the households in the lowest quintile, measured in monthly pesos. Non-labor transfers are
2.7 times higher for the highest quintile.  Similar to Table 2, off-farm earnings are an
important source of income, especially for those in the lowest quintile where 68% of their
total income is derived from off-farm activities.
The difference in land assets between the highest and lowest quintile is only 2.2
RFE hectares, which is not entirely surprising given our sample of poor households. The
average education level of the household in the highest quintile is almost two full years
higher than the lowest quintile.  Members of the highest quintile also tend to migrant
more.  Poverty is strongly associated with ethnicity, as fifty percent of households in the
lowest quintile are indigenous compared to only 25% in the highest.  Also while the
number of agricultural workers per household varies little across the quintiles, households
in the highest quintile have almost three times the number of nonagricultural workers as
the lowest quintile.18
Table 3. Mean characteristics of the poor across welfare levels
Quintiles of the welfare index 1 2 3 4 5 Total
Number of households 2,740 2,740 2,740 2,740 2,740 13,700
Quintile mean -2.20 -1.23 -0.28 0.94 3.04 0.05
Quintile minimum -4.22 -1.67 -0.79 0.27 1.72 -4.22
Quintile maximum -1.67 -0.79 0.27 1.72 9.46 9.46
Occupation type within the household
Agricultural workers 0.88 0.94 0.91 0.82 0.63 0.84
Nonagricultural workers 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.22
Seller 0.20 0.25 0.26 0.27 0.32 0.26
Family-related business 0.38 0.42 0.45 0.56 0.70 0.50
Total household monthly income in pesos
Total 799.30 933.34 1125.75 1343.16 1847.73 1209.86
Labor wages 643.97 747.95 887.91 1047.93 1424.83 950.52
    Agricultural wages 464.72 487.44 503.99 509.95 482.21 489.66
    Non-agricultural wages 78.11 125.06 206.00 305.18 536.29 250.13
    Self-employment 68.24 92.54 111.93 142.40 230.91 129.20
    Family-related business 29.39 37.97 58.95 80.30 156.78 72.68
    Other labor related wages 2.58 4.26 3.27 7.42 14.00 6.31
Non-labor transfers 155.33 185.39 237.84 295.23 422.90 259.34
Total household monthly expenditure in pesos
Total 532.34 616.00 703.97 807.59 1101.22 752.22
    Food expenditures 418.38 464.10 502.10 555.79 711.88 503.45
    Non-food expenditures 113.96 151.90 201.88 251.80 389.33 221.78
Land assets in hectares
Total rainfed 2.28 2.28 2.52 2.74 3.78 2.72
Total irrigated 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.15
Total in rainfed equivalence 2.46 2.53 2.87 3.21 4.63 3.14
Farm animals
Horses 0.21 0.31 0.50 0.65 0.80 0.50
Mules 0.33 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.60 0.48
Oxen 0.07 0.12 0.15 0.18 0.23 0.15
Goats 1.15 1.77 1.65 1.99 2.84 1.88
Cattle 0.56 0.73 1.21 1.64 3.05 1.44
Pigs 1.01 1.27 1.49 1.47 1.58 1.36
Household characteristics
Household size 5.43 5.92 6.16 6.33 6.29 6.03
Number of adult equivalent persons 4.84 5.38 5.72 5.93 5.96 5.56
Number of children 1.51 1.75 1.90 1.87 1.69 1.74
Number of migrants (by village) 6.64 7.95 8.62 8.66 9.01 8.18
Maximum education in household 4.39 5.38 6.05 6.58 7.56 5.99
Mean level of education in household 1.96 2.45 2.86 3.25 3.89 2.88
Head of household variables
Education 1.91 2.31 2.46 2.64 3.04 2.47
Age 46.99 48.10 48.68 49.52 51.75 49.01
Male-head 0.89 0.92 0.93 0.92 0.91 0.91
Indigenous head 0.59 0.56 0.42 0.28 0.17 0.4019
Thus far the descriptive analysis suggests a strong positive correlation between
land and welfare.   In the following section, we explore this relationship further with
hopes of quantifying the economic value of land.
V.  Estimation Results: Welfare generating potential of land
In this section, we estimate a household welfare equation to explore the
relationship between land and welfare.  There are three main findings. First, compared to
the semiparametric approach a linear specification estimates a much lower marginal
value of land.  Second, there is a considerable difference in the return to land when using
a consumption measure versus our welfare index.  Finally, the marginal value of land
differs according to a household’s complementary assets and contextual settings.
Our final sample is restricted to the 12,034 landowners with complete household
and village level data.  Excluding the landless reduces the possibility of selection bias and
ensures that the estimation is across a sample of households that do not pursue wildly
different livelihood strategies.  The final specification of the welfare equation consists of
land, household characteristics, social and institutional assets, village characteristics, and
states dummies.  We also include the number of working-aged adults in the household by
their education level.  Since members of households with smaller farms may tend to
migrate more, we incorporate into our definition of the number of working-aged adults,
all the household members that have migrated within the last five years.  This will help to
mitigate any potential bias in household labor force due to endogenous migration
strategies.
Regression (A) in Table 4 assumes a linear specification and uses monthly
consumption expenditures as the measure of household welfare.  The second and third20
columns report the OLS estimates with their corresponding t-statistics.  Although
significant, the estimated return to land is quite small.  An increase of one RFE hectare
will increase monthly consumption by 11.5 pesos, which is only 1.5% of the average
monthly consumption of the sample.  This result is an order of magnitude that is similar
to those reported in López and Valdés (2000).  This estimate also serves as a useful
benchmark since it is based on a regression specification that is typically used in this
literature.
8
 Interestingly, education also contributes little to current consumption.  An
additional year of education for the household head will improve monthly consumption
by only 11 pesos.  Even among male adults, there is no statistical difference between the
return to an additional uneducated male and a male adult with a secondary education.
Fortunately, for female adults the return to education is much steeper.  Women with just a
primary education contribute 3 times more to consumption than uneducated females, and
those with more than a secondary education contribute almost 4 times as much.
Several contextual variables are important determinants of household welfare.
Access to a federal road increases monthly consumption by 12%.  Proximity to an urban
center and presence of a village church are also positively associated with consumption.
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (1993) document that 80% of the indigenous
population in Mexico lives in poverty and in our sample 65% of the indigenous
households are in fact classified as poor.  With much of rural poverty associated with the
indigenous population, it is perhaps not too surprising that indigenous households on
average consume 11 percent less relative non-indigenous households.
                                               
8 Several studies also use a log-linear specification. With this specification, we estimate a land to income
elasticity of .105.21
When we consider a different measure of welfare, our results are quite different
(see regression (C) in Table 4).  With our dependent variable measured in welfare units,
we divide each of the estimated coefficients by the monetary transfer coefficient, .00015,
to obtain results that are easier to interpret.
 9  This calculation is reported in the eighth
column along with its standard error.  The marginal welfare value of land is 0.03 and
highly significant. This suggests that increasing landholdings by one RFE hectare will
increase welfare by 201 monthly pesos, which is 17 times the estimated return to land
measured in consumption.  For a better sense of the order of magnitude, the average
monthly wage of an agricultural worker is 700 pesos, and the price of a metric ton of
corn, in 1998, was on average 1460 pesos. If two months are required to cultivate a one-
hectare plot of corn and the average yield for rainfed corn is 0.8 then 222 pesos is a
sensible amount.
Measured with our welfare index, human assets are associated with large welfare
effects. A marginal increase in the education level of the household head will raise
welfare by 608 monthly pesos, an amount which is 3 times the return to land.  While the
addition of an adult male with a primary education increases welfare by a significant
amount of 1504 pesos, the return of an adult male with more than a secondary education
is 4557 pesos; a differential gain of 203%.  Uneducated adults do not contribute to
household welfare at the margin, and children and elderly members of the household are
negatively associated with household welfare. There is still a high cost associated with
ethnicity as being indigenous reduces welfare by 5073 monthly pesos.
                                               
9 Monetary transfers are the monthly amount of pesos a household receives from non-labor sources. This
includes government transfer from PROCAMPO and other scholarships.22
Migration assets outside of Mexico contribute 282 more monthly pesos to welfare
than migration assets within the country but outside of the respective state.  Contained in
only 14% of the villages, the presence of a health center increases welfare quite
substantially by 1587 monthly pesos.  Access to state and federal roads, which helps to
reduce transaction costs, contribute greatly to welfare, as does proximity to an urban
center.  After controlling for differential asset positions and village characteristics, state
effects remain significant. Relative to Guerrero only Michoacán is poorer.
Before proceeding with the semiparametric analysis, we explore the robustness of
our results and consider the possibility of endogeneity bias.  Despite the dearth of data on
land market activities, our assumption to treat land as exogenous depends on the absence
of intergenerational transmission of unobserved characteristics that determine land
endowments as well as household welfare.  Given our cross-sectional data, it is difficult
to imagine a meaningful household level variable that is correlated with land endowments
but does not affect welfare.  Consequently, we use as instruments variables that are
statistically valid, but admittedly ad hoc and imperfect.  For our consumption regression,
we instrument land with average village farm size, age of the household head, and gender
of the household head.  Similarly, for the welfare index regression we use average village
farm size, the number of uneducated males, and the number of uneducated females.  In
both cases, the first-stage regressions (not shown) indicate that the instruments are strong
predictors of household landholdings.
10  The overidentification tests fail to reject the null
that the instruments are statistically valid (Davidson and MacKinnon 1993).  The IV
estimations of the welfare equation for both consumption and the welfare index produced
                                               
10 The joint test of significance of the instruments in the first stage regression yield an F-statistic of 70.6
and 64.6 for consumption and the welfare index, respectively.23
estimates that were not statistically different from the OLS estimations (see Appendix).
11
In terms of monthly consumption, the marginal value of land increased slightly to 15.26
pesos.  And when measured with the welfare index, the marginal value of land also
increased to 275.47 monthly pesos.
For another check of robustness, we estimate a village fixed-effects model to test
whether any unobserved village-level variable affects the estimated return to land.  The
fixed-effects estimates (see Appendix) increase slightly but are also not significantly
different from the OLS regression (F-statistic is 0.08). The estimated marginal value of
land is 216 pesos compared to the 201 pesos reported in Table 4.  As long as land quality
remains constant within villages, it appears that adjusting land area by its yield has done a
reasonable job of controlling for land quality differences across villages.   Finally, we
estimate a log linear specification of landholdings to discover that, evaluated at the
average land size in the sample, the marginal welfare value of land more than triples to
611 monthly pesos.  This result suggests that the specification does matter and that a
semiparametric approach to the data is warranted.
                                               
11 In an extended Hausman test, the F-statistics for the consumption and welfare index regression are 1.55
and 1.15, respectively.24
Table 4. Parametric and semiparametric estimation of the welfare equation







x Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Peso
value
Land assets  (RFE Hectares) 3.14 11.49 7.2 0.03 8.36 201.05
(52.06)
Monetary transfers (*1000) 123.99 0.03 2.9 0.02 2.56 0.15 4.52 1
Head of household characteristics
Gender (dummy) 0.92 26.23 1.38 22.44 1.13 0.29 4.68 1969.15
(601.82)
Age (years) 49.20 0.45 0.9 0.12 0.24 0.02 9.23 99.23
(24.55)
Education level 2.49 11.00 3.72 10.41 4.18 0.09 11.10 608.22
(145.03)
Labor force (number of individuals)
Male adults with  0 == education 0.19 63.79 4.12 60.11 4.52 -0.04 -1.01 -262.99
(267.06)
Male adults with 6 0 < < education 0.47 43.47 4.78 41.35 4.61 0.06 2.24 407.28
(201.70)
Male adults with  6 == education 0.31 61.23 6.63 59.02 6.66 0.23 7.84 1503.95
(386.12)
Male adults with  9 6 £ < education 0.16 68.15 4.87 61.68 5.44 0.47 12.52 3139.64
(737.25)
Male adults with  9 > education 0.05 114.08 5.71 106.76 5.38 0.68 9.47 4556.76
(1124.08)
Female adults with  0 == education 0.32 39.28 3.55 37.63 3.52 0.03 0.77 166.00
(217.53)25
Female adults with 6 0 < < education 0.44 44.42 4.41 42.54 4.47 0.30 10.03 2017.23
(488.81)
Female adults with  6 == education 0.28 92.98 8.42 90.70 9.49 0.54 17.77 3611.89
(826.10)
Female adults with  9 6 £ < education 0.12 117.97 6.8 116.35 9.35 0.66 15.65 4383.89
(1011.85)
Female adults with  9 > education 0.03 157.66 5.67 152.06 6.55 1.05 11.12 7004.26
(1688.03)
Children (under 17 years old) 2.59 30.17 11.52 29.03 11.33 -0.01 -1.02 -53.81
(53.50)
Males, at least 55 years old 0.35 26.45 1.65 21.80 1.45 -0.12 -2.38 -785.92
(371.19)
Females, at least 55 years old 0.31 39.69 3.07 36.76 3.08 0.24 6.16 1580.38
(434.60)
Social and institutional assets
Indigenous household (dummy) 0.40 -89.26 -6.85 -78.59 -6.35 -0.76 -19.7 -5072.80
(1162.12)
Access to agricultural cooperative
(dummy)
0.04 -33.42 -1.6 -43.87 -1.75 0.01 0.17 88.40
(509.5)
Access to credit cooperative (dummy) 0.01 -
113.90
-2.61 -110.7 -1.81 -0.41 -2.34 -2754.02
(1333.44)
Church present (dummy) 0.40 30.20 2.81 28.71 2.80 0.02 0.56 119.68
(217.68)
Migration Assets (number of individuals in the village)
Out of the state 3.28 -8.76 -5.52 -8.29 -4.74 0.01 2.91 95.84
(38.57)
Out of Mexico 1.21 16.00 6.85 16.27 8.39 0.06 7.36 378.17
(96.72)
Locality Characteristics
State Road (dummy) 0.17 34.18 2.34 37.59 2.68 0.22 4.93 1465.21
(438.46)
Federal Road (dummy) 0.26 88.47 6.58 93.06 7.80 0.22 5.74 1488.07
(416)
Health center (dummy) 0.14 2.39 0.13 -4.38 -0.29 0.24 4.85 1586.7126
(485.17)
DICONSA shop (dummy) 0.30 31.97 2.75 38.08 3.44 -0.08 -2.20 -500.20
(257.33)
Min. distance to an urban center (km) 107.37 -1.21 -6.85 -1.17 -6.08 -0.01 -7.45 -29.69
(7.71)
Min. distance to the state capital (km) 154.86 0.08 0.73 0.07 0.56 -0.00 -3.79 -10.42
(3.57)
Male agricultural wage (daily) 32.56 1.27 2.59 1.08 2.35 0.02 12.96 129.35
(30.29)
Male non-agricultural wage (daily) 3.82 0.80 1.95 0.85 2.12 -0.00 -1.09 -10.33
(9.77)
Male self-employed wage (daily) 1.69 0.00 0 0.18 0.29 0.01 2.54 34.21
(15.65)
Female agricultural wage (daily) 13.02 0.06 0.2 0.00 -0.02 0.00 4.34 29.67
(9.42)
Female non-agricultural wage (daily) 1.14 -1.66 -2.22 -1.57 -1.88 0.01 2.56 48.05
(21.15)
Female self-employed wage (daily) 1.14 1.03 1.36 0.91 1.14 0.00 -0.07 -1.23
(17.3)
Population 393.12 -0.02 -1.19 -0.03 -1.44 0.00 5.40 2.31
(0.68)
State dummies
Hidalgo 0.17 218.05 9.49 218.21 10.78 -0.22 -3.50 -1474.54
(527.27)




Puebla 0.15 122.35 4.91 120.67 5.40 -0.45 -6.54 -2982.35
(795.62)
Queretaro 0.04 -14.47 -0.42 -32.56 -1.02 -1.19 -10.6 -7926.20
(1879.62)
San Luis Potsi 0.15 22.48 0.9 -3.69 -0.16 -0.50 -6.85 -3324.70
(860.33)
Veracruz 0.28 34.44 1.44 23.23 1.01 -0.60 -8.36 -4015.28
(1001.99)27
Intercept 1 393.46 9 - - -1.34 -9.71 -
Endogenous variable (mean welfare) .08 749.67
Number of observations 12034
F(33, 12124) 49.88 42.85 132
2 R 0.15 0.13 0.32
* Standard errors were computed with the delta method and are displayed in parentheses.    The t-statistics are based on Eicker-White corrected standard errors.28
Semiparametric Estimation
The regressions (B) and (D) displayed in Table 4 correspond to the second step of
the semiparametric procedure: estimation of equation (6) above.  Interestingly, the
semiparametric procedure does not estimate coefficients significantly different from the
estimates of the OLS regression. The resulting semiparametric estimate of the welfare
value of land,  ) (X g , is shown in Figure 4, where welfare appears as an increasing
concave function of land.
12  The vertical axis refers to welfare units and includes the
constant term. While the shape of the welfare value of land becomes increasing linear as











































Figure 4: Welfare value of land
13
                                               
12 The graph corresponding to the consumption measure is very similar in appearance.










































































Figure 5: Marginal value of land
Figure 5 displays the marginal value of land for both consumption and the welfare
index along with their 95% point-wise confidence intervals.
14  The bottom figure
corresponds to Figure 4 above, except that the y-axis has been normalized to the
appropriate pesos value.  Regardless of the measure of welfare, the shape of the two
                                               
14 It should be noted that pointwise confidence intervals do not suggest that all the estimated values jointly
fall within these bounds. Cleveland and Devlin (1988) have proposed an F-test to compare a parametric
specification against a non-parametric specification, and this will be incorporated in the next version of the
paper.30
marginal value of land curves are quite similar.  An additional hectare of land for farmers
with at most one hectare is associated with an increase in their monthly consumption of
82 pesos (see Table 5).  This represents an increase of 14% over the average consumption
among these households.  Measured in terms of our welfare index, for these same
farmers, an additional plot of land translates into a 1636 pesos increase in their welfare.
With both measures, the curves appear to asymptote at an estimated value that is
comparable to the parametric fit, suggesting that a linear specification can grossly
underestimate the marginal value of land.  A simple average of the return to land measure
in monthly expenditure is 43 pesos, which is almost four times the benchmark case of
11.5 pesos.
Table 5.  Marginal value of land in monthly pesos
Consumption Welfare Index








£1 3557 81.9 1636.3
1-3 5180 37.0 810.9
<3 3452 10.1 172.8
Recalling Figure 1, the shape of Figure 5 is remarkably similar to our theoretical
predictions of the impact of a labor market constraint on the return to land.  Figure 5
appears to capture the fact that for small farmers additional land garners a return that is
higher than the simple production value of the extra plot of land.  Additional land will
increase the marginal product value of household labor and other productive assets thus
reducing the impact of any distortions that may exist.  The shape suggests that a lack of
rural employment opportunities is a possible constraint that these household face.31
Heterogeneity in the marginal value of land
An important component of this measurement exercise is to account for the large
variation in income generating strategies pursued by the rural poor.  The high degree of
heterogeneity in both asset positions and exposure to market imperfections suggests that
the marginal value of land should not be constant across poor rural households. While our
previous parametric and semiparametric specifications permit for the demographic and
contextual characteristics of the household to shift the welfare equation, we still restrict
the coefficient to be the same across a very diverse sample.
The pooling of data across different subgroups may also cause spurious curvature
in the semiparametric estimation of land (Bhalotra and Attfield 1998).  Suppose, for
example, that the relationship between welfare and land is actually linear, but that
indigenous land is systematically smaller and produces a higher return. The marginal
value of land for non-indigenous households will be lower and lie predominantly to the
right of the indigenous sample.  While the relationship is in fact linear, the combination
of these data will result in a nonlinear presentation.
Table 7 compares the return to land across different subgroups of the population
using parametric and semiparametric estimation of the welfare index.  With a linear
specification, the return to land falls short of the 5% significance level only within a few
subgroups (community population size, Gulf, access to health).  However, when
comparing the difference between the subgroups only the indigenous and non-indigenous
split recorded a significant difference in the return to land.  A priori, this is a curious
result since one would expect that access to a road or a higher average household
education level would affect the marginal value of land.  Yet this presumes, incorrectly,32
that a linear specification is a good approximation. When we relax the functional
specification, the marginal value of land, as displayed in Figure 6, does vary across these
subgroups.
The income generating potential of indigenous land is three times lower than non-
indigenous land for landholdings greater than 3 hectares.  Households residing in a
village with a road and a health center garner a higher return to land.  Access to a paved
road is important for reducing transaction costs on product and factor markets, which will
increase the return to land. While it may appear strange that access to a health center
should affect the income generating potential of land, this variable is most likely a proxy
for market integration and the degree of urbanization.  Households with a higher average
adult education level also achieve a higher return to their land.
In all the plots, the general curvature of the land function remained consistent.
This provides some evidence that the curvature is not spurious.33



































































































































*The standard errors displayed in parentheses are computed by using the delta method. The numbers in the
brackets are number of households with the corresponding amount of land.  All these regressions include
the same covariates displayed in Table 3.  (**) denotes difference within subgroup is significant at <.05.
The t-statistic is based on Eicker-White corrected standard errors.34




















































































































































































































































































































































Heterogeneity in the level of welfare
To better understand the value of land access in reducing poverty, we investigate
how differences in asset positions and contextual settings translate to differences in
welfare levels.  In order to decompose these differences, we re-estimate our welfare
equation using a spline function for land.  In this situation, a flexible parametric
specification is needed because the nonparametric approach came at the expense of not
being able to identify the constant term.  However, the nonparametric exploration of the
land to welfare contour does guide us in our choice of the number and location of the
knot points, which in a spline regression can be fairly arbitrary.
In the spirit of Oaxaca’s (1973) wage-gap decomposition, we explore the welfare
differential between subgroups.  The welfare gap,  B A W W - , between group A and group
B can be decomposed as,
B B A B A A B A B A X X X Z g Z g W W b b b ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( - + - + - = - (7)
where  ) ( ), ( Z g Z g B A denote household landholdings, and B A X X ,  are the average
endowments of the determinants of household welfare. The first term in equation (7)
represents, at a given farm size, the difference in the return to land between the two
groups.  The second term captures differences in the estimated return to the determinants
of welfare due to omitted factors.  The last term is the portion of the welfare gap
attributed to differences in endowments.
The decomposition of the difference in predicted welfare levels between
households with a low and high average education level is depicted by landholdings in
Figure 7.   Here, we see that access to land does little to alleviate poverty among36
households with low education levels.
15  Differences in endowments explain on average
57% of the welfare gap. While highly educated households would still experience higher
welfare levels even after controlling for endowment differences, only those low-educated
households with less than 2 hectares of land would be below poverty.  This graph
emphasizes the importance of an integrated poverty alleviation strategy.  A single
approach, such as land access will do little for households with few complementary
assets.
Figure 8 shows the decomposition between indigenous and non-indigenous
households. In this case, eliminating the endowment differential between indigenous and
non-indigenous households would be insufficient to raise the indigenous households with
less than 15 hectares of land out of poverty.  Non-indigenous households receive an
unexplained premium that is on average 55% of the welfare differential.  If indigenous
households were to receive the same return to their assets as non-indigenous households,
indigenous households would only require access to three hectares of land to reach the
poverty line.
Figure 9 plots the difference in welfare between those households with access to a
road and those households without road access.  With access to a paved road, households
only need less than 1 hectare of land to reach the poverty line, compared to household
without road access who need 9 hectares.  Again, we see that if there were no differences
in either endowments or in this case, the return to land, only households with less than 3
hectares of land would remain in poverty.
                                               
15 The poverty line was determined by estimating the poverty indicator on our welfare index. The threshold
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Figure 7: Welfare as a function of land assets:
The role of asset complementarity
W0 = g0 land ( )+ ¢  b  0x 0    Welfare of group 0
¢  W  = g0 land ( )+ ¢  b  0x  1          +  non -land assets of group1
¢  ¢  W  = g0 land ( )+ ¢  b  1x  1          +  return to assets of group1
W 1 = g1 land ( )+ ¢  b  1x  1            +  return to land of group1
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Figure 8: Welfare as a function of land assets:
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Figure 9: Welfare as a function of land assets:
The role of the context39
VI.  Conclusion
There has been much controversy about the value of access to land in reducing
poverty.  Lopéz and Valdés (2000), in particular, have argued that land contributes little
to income and that consequently, it is better to look at other instruments if poverty is a
concern.  Yet, we consider that the methodology they used has several deficiencies,
which we proceed to correct in this paper.  In addition, we believe that this overall
statement needs to be qualified to recognize the considerable heterogeneity of conditions
under which land is used; in particular, the role of household characteristics,
complementary assets, and the context where land is used.  To do this, we measure the
potential of land to generate income in rural Mexico in an effort to provide more accurate
measurements and to identify the contexts under which land access can help to reduce
poverty.  In general, we find that the marginal welfare value of land is quite high for
households with less than 2 hectares of rainfed corn equivalence. For these farmers, an
additional plot of land will increase welfare by as much as 1000 monthly pesos. This
represents 1.4 times the average monthly income of an agricultural worker in our sample.
The high return to land captures the increase in the value of the marginal product of other
household assets due to market failures, in addition to the increase in the direct
production value of the land.  We find that the shape of the mapping between land and
welfare is consistent with a theory of labor rationing in off-farm employment.
Given the variation in livelihood strategies resulting from differences in asset
positions and market exposure across households, we investigate the role heterogeneity
plays in land’s ability to generate economic livelihood.  We observe that complementary
and contextual assets of the household greatly influence land’s income generating40
potential.  Social assets such as ethnicity lower the marginal value of land, whereas
households with more human capital receive a higher return to land. Households that face
lower transaction costs as measured by access to roads and access to a health center,
garner a return to land that is twice as high.  Moreover, access to only one hectare of land
is sufficient for households with access to a paved road to escape poverty.
These findings suggest that in particular contexts land can be an important element of
a poverty reducing strategy.  Besides better access to land, it is also important to improve
complementary assets such as education and to reduce the market imperfections that limit
the effective utilization of these assets.  Promoting rural development to increase off-farm
employment will greatly benefit those households with limited access to land.  Policies
that recommend massive land redistribution, while politically difficult, may not be
necessary, as better access to even minimal amounts of land can translate into significant
welfare gains if this is done under conditions that allow effective use of the land.41
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Appendix A: A stylized agricultural household model
Three important assumptions are made in this model:
1)  Land is exogenous.
2)  There exists a probability of unemployment.
3)  Access to credit increases with land size.
The household’s decision problem is to maximize
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-  The production function is Cobb-Douglas with 
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-  The price of a metric ton of corn, p, is 1500 pesos.
-  The average wage for a nonagricultural worker, w, is 1280 pesos per month.
-  The average per unit cost of corn production, q, is 460 pesos per month.
-  The interest rate, i, is .05.
The solution to this problem can be characterized by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for
constrained maximization.44
Appendix B: IV estimation of welfare index
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   12034
-------------+----------------------------- -           F( 41, 11992) =  136.30
       Model |  13957.1794    41   340.41901            Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |   29481.883 11992  2.45846256           R-squared     =  0.3213
-------------+----------------------------- -           Adj R-squared =  0.3190
       Total |  43439.0624 12033  3.60999438           Root MSE      =  1.5679
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     welfare |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    land_rfe |   .0395575   .0075156     5.26   0.000     .0248258    .0542892
     hohmale |   .2788248   .0598936     4.66   0.000     .1614237    .3962259
      hohage |   .0147325   .0015964     9.23   0.000     .0116033    .0178617
      hohedu |    .092898   .0067641    13.73   0.000     .0796392    .1061568
    hohindig |  -.7548928   .0379816   -19.88   0.000    -.8293428   -.6804429
  n_outstate |   .0143705   .0054364     2.64   0.008     .0037143    .0250267
   n_country |   .0572624   .0060037     9.54   0.000     .0454942    .0690306
     ag_coop |   .0081641   .0773921     0.11   0.916    -.1435369    .1598651
 credit_coop |  -.4068156   .1895311    -2.15   0.032    -.7783273   -.0353039
      church |   .0154047   .0318284     0.48   0.628     -.046984    .0777935
         est |    .221462   .0434762     5.09   0.000     .1362416    .3066825
         fed |   .2271161   .0370429     6.13   0.000      .154506    .2997261
      health |   .2378403   .0468043     5.08   0.000     .1460964    .3295842
     diconsa |  -.0716731    .034358    -2.09   0.037    -.1390203   -.0043259
    min_dist |  -.0043764   .0006011    -7.28   0.000    -.0055547   -.0031981
    dist_cap |  -.0015609    .000395    -3.95   0.000    -.0023351   -.0007867
      wm_jor |   .0191097   .0014347    13.32   0.000     .0162976    .0219219
      wm_obr |  -.0013965   .0012478    -1.12   0.263    -.0038424    .0010493
      wm_emp |   .0052212   .0018958     2.75   0.006     .0015052    .0089372
      ww_jor |   .0044603   .0009222     4.84   0.000     .0026526    .0062681
      ww_obr |   .0071439   .0025902     2.76   0.006     .0020667    .0122212
      ww_emp |  -.0002518   .0024837    -0.10   0.919    -.0051203    .0046167
      state2 |  -.2264458   .0625597    -3.62   0.000    -.3490729   -.1038187
      state3 |   -1.56974   .0787793   -19.93   0.000     -1.72416    -1.41532
      state4 |  -.4461384    .068946    -6.47   0.000    -.5812838   -.3109931
      state5 |  -1.198849   .0997399   -12.02   0.000    -1.394355   -1.003342
      state6 |  -.5243572   .0706293    -7.42   0.000     -.662802   -.3859123
      state7 |  -.6109551   .0709643    -8.61   0.000    -.7500565   -.4718536
         pop |   .0003494   .0000674     5.18   0.000     .0002173    .0004815
  lprimary_m |   .0715371   .0258231     2.77   0.006     .0209195    .1221546
   primary_m |   .2273151   .0272466     8.34   0.000     .1739073    .2807229
 secondary_m |   .4692215   .0350698    13.38   0.000     .4004791     .537964
      msec_m |   .6745278   .0616612    10.94   0.000     .5536618    .7953938
  lprimary_f |   .2923964   .0273094    10.71   0.000     .2388656    .3459272
   primary_f |   .5356178    .029178    18.36   0.000     .4784241    .5928114
 secondary_f |   .6520432   .0386009    16.89   0.000     .5763792    .7277071
      msec_f |   1.040923   .0721579    14.43   0.000     .8994818    1.182364
     child16 |  -.0074693   .0078512    -0.95   0.341     -.022859    .0079204
        m55p |  -.1086002   .0451427    -2.41   0.016    -.1970872   -.0201133
        f55p |    .233022     .03609     6.46   0.000     .1622797    .3037643
    transfer |   .0001436   .0000277     5.18   0.000     .0000892    .0001979
       _cons |   -1.34414   .1346617    -9.98   0.000    -1.608099   -1.080181
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instrumented:  land_rfe
Instruments:   hohmale hohage hohedu hohindig n_outstate n_country ag_coop
               credit_coop church est fed health diconsa min_dist dist_cap
               wm_jor wm_obr wm_emp ww_jor ww_obr ww_emp state2 state3 state4
               state5 state6 state7 pop lprimary_m primary_m secondary_m msec_m
               lprimary_f primary_f secondary_f msec_f child16 m55p f55p
               transfer mvland noedu_m noedu_f
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test of overidentifying restrictions:  1.363844  Chi-sq( 2)  P-value =  .505645
Appendix C: IV estimation of consumption
Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =   12034
-------------+----------------------------- -           F( 41, 11992) =   49.94
       Model |   570044113    41  13903515.0            Prob > F      =  0.0000
    Residual |  3.1551e+09 11992  263096.617           R-squared     =  0.1530
-------------+----------------------------- -           Adj R-squared =  0.1501
       Total |  3.7251e+09 12033  309573.568           Root MSE      =  512.93
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     consumo |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    land_rfe |   15.26886   2.450065     6.23   0.000     10.46633    20.07138
      hohedu |   10.79402   2.295196     4.70   0.000     6.295066    15.29298
    hohindig |   -87.8887   12.52606    -7.02   0.000    -112.4418   -63.33559
  n_outstate |  -8.783285   1.776308    -4.94   0.000    -12.26514   -5.301435
   n_country |   16.25642    1.96315     8.28   0.000     12.40833    20.10451
     ag_coop |  -35.54149   25.31496    -1.40   0.160    -85.16291    14.07994
 credit_coop |  -113.6722   62.00514    -1.83   0.067    -235.2123    7.867889
      church |   29.11359   10.40721     2.80   0.005     8.713778    49.51339
         est |    35.2873   14.22167     2.48   0.013     7.410528    63.16407
         fed |   89.82468   12.11314     7.42   0.000     66.08097    113.5684
      health |    3.01789   15.30874     0.20   0.844    -26.98973    33.02551
     diconsa |   33.45773   11.24018     2.98   0.003     11.42516     55.4903
    min_dist |  -1.174792   .1967881    -5.97   0.000    -1.560528   -.7890553
    dist_cap |   .0811784   .1292673     0.63   0.530    -.1722064    .3345631
      wm_jor |   1.152106   .4694295     2.45   0.014      .231948    2.072264
      wm_obr |   .8562415   .4079604     2.10   0.036     .0565731     1.65591
      wm_emp |   .0387808    .620256     0.06   0.950    -1.177021    1.254583
      ww_jor |   .0712315   .3018506     0.24   0.813    -.5204445    .6629074
      ww_obr |  -1.688923   .8471361    -1.99   0.046    -3.349447    -.028399
      ww_emp |   .9963238    .812617     1.23   0.220     -.596537    2.589185
      state2 |   216.5909   20.55124    10.54   0.000     176.3071    256.8746
      state3 |   83.18642    25.9106     3.21   0.001     32.39745    133.9754
      state4 |   123.3626   22.64524     5.45   0.000     78.97426     167.751
      state5 |  -18.66814    32.6633    -0.57   0.568    -82.69349    45.35721
      state6 |   14.34688   23.31932     0.62   0.538    -31.36276    60.05652
      state7 |   32.43271   23.31679     1.39   0.164    -13.27197    78.13739
         pop |  -.0229281   .0220364    -1.04   0.298     -.066123    .0202668
     noedu_m |   65.74082   13.06808     5.03   0.000     40.12527    91.35636
  lprimary_m |    45.5401   8.870244     5.13   0.000     28.15298    62.92721
   primary_m |    61.4094   8.948385     6.86   0.000     43.86912    78.94968
 secondary_m |   67.81863    11.4469     5.92   0.000     45.38084    90.25641
      msec_m |   112.3139   20.12876     5.58   0.000     72.85823    151.7695
     noedu_f |   38.11331   10.80643     3.53   0.000     16.93096    59.29566
  lprimary_f |   43.03384   9.669038     4.45   0.000     24.08096    61.98672
   primary_f |   91.57665   9.685673     9.45   0.000     72.59117    110.5621
 secondary_f |   116.4902   12.65273     9.21   0.000     91.68877    141.2916
      msec_f |   154.8838   23.61277     6.56   0.000      108.599    201.1687
     child16 |   30.35625   2.567021    11.83   0.000     25.32447    35.38802
        m55p |   36.90152   11.77339     3.13   0.002     13.82376    59.97927
        f55p |   38.46339   11.37419     3.38   0.001     16.16813    60.75865
    transfer |   .0236005   .0090724     2.60   0.009     .0058172    .0413838
       _cons |   425.1326   33.49564    12.69   0.000     359.4757    490.7894
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Instrumented:  land_rfe
Instruments:   hohedu hohindig n_outstate n_country ag_coop credit_coop church
               est fed health diconsa min_dist dist_cap wm_jor wm_obr wm_emp
               ww_jor ww_obr ww_emp state2 state3 state4 state5 state6 state7
               pop noedu_m lprimary_m primary_m secondary_m msec_m noedu_f
               lprimary_f primary_f secondary_f msec_f child16 m55p f55p
               transfer mvland hohage hohmale
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Test of overidentifying restrictions:  1.814439  Chi-sq( 2)  P-value =  .403646
Appendix D: Fixed-effects model
Fixed-effects (within) regression               Number of obs      =     12034
Group variable (i) : locality                   Number of groups   =       489
R-sq:  within  = 0.1458                         Obs per group: min =         1
       between = 0.3564                                         avg =      24.6
       overall = 0.2059                                        max =       146
                                                 F(19,11526)        =    103.57
corr(u_i, Xb)  = 0.2172                         Prob > F           =    0.0000
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     welfare |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    land_rfe |   .0233751   .0024808     9.42   0.000     .0185122     .028238
     hohmale |   .2029607   .0544846     3.73   0.000     .0961617    .3097597
      hohage |     .01022   .0014302     7.15   0.000     .0074166    .0130234
      hohedu |   .0728743   .0070151    10.39   0.000     .0591235     .086625
    hohindig |  -.2126327   .0625184    -3.40   0.001    -.3351794   -.0900859
     noedu_m |   .0031361   .0367802     0.09   0.932    -.0689594    .0752316
  lprimary_m |    .114797   .0248538     4.62   0.000     .0660794    .1635146
   primary_m |   .2007368   .0244568     8.21   0.000     .1527972    .2486763
 secondary_m |   .4051641   .0312988    12.95   0.000     .3438131    .4665151
      msec_m |   .6404119   .0549464    11.66   0.000     .5327076    .7481162
     noedu_f |   .1073251   .0298646     3.59   0.000     .0487854    .1658648
  lprimary_f |    .274125   .0263139    10.42   0.000     .2225453    .3257047
   primary_f |   .4041092   .0265331    15.23   0.000     .3520998    .4561186
 secondary_f |   .5143274   .0343624    14.97   0.000     .4469713    .5816835
      msec_f |   .9275207   .0637595    14.55   0.000     .8025413      1.0525
     child16 |   .0083645   .0071116     1.18   0.240    -.0055755    .0223045
        m55p |  -.0764831   .0411816    -1.86   0.063     -.157206    .0042399
        f55p |   .2190012   .0326534     6.71   0.000     .1549949    .2830074
    transfer |    .000108   .0000243     4.44   0.000     .0000603    .0001556
       _cons |  -1.428215   .0997004   -14.33   0.000    -1.623644   -1.232785
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
     sigma_u |  1.1959506
     sigma_e |  1.3530587
         rho |  .43859828   (fraction of variance due to  u_i)
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
F test that all u_i=0:     F(488, 11526) =    12.91           Prob > F = 0.000047
Appendix E: Log linear specification
Regression with robust standard errors                 Number of obs =   12034
                                                       F ( 43, 11990) =  139.13
                                                        Prob > F      =  0.0000
                                                       R-squared      =  0.3300
                                                       Root MSE       =   1.558
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
             |               Robust
     welfare |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
      lnland |   .2643416   .0168204    15.72   0.000     .2313708    .2973124
     hohmale |   .2795143   .0629829     4.44   0.000     .1560577     .402971
      hohage |   .0135303   .0016037     8.44   0.000     .0103868    .0166738
      hohedu |   .0891497   .0081613    10.92   0.000     .0731522    .1051472
    hohindig |  -.7177157   .0384394   -18.67   0.000    -.7930632   -.6423682
  n_outstate |   .0161118   .0048928     3.29   0.001     .0065212    .0257024
   n_country |   .0568002   .0075449     7.53   0.000     .0420109    .0715895
     ag_coop |  -.0293716   .0759464    -0.39   0.699    -.1782388    .1194956
 credit_coop |  -.4299746   .1743237    -2.47   0.014    -.7716773   -.0882719
      church |   .0106976   .0320157     0.33   0.738    -.0520584    .0734535
         est |   .2318223   .0441428     5.25   0.000     .1452954    .3183493
         fed |   .2422355   .0386035     6.27   0.000     .1665663    .3179047
      health |   .2146993   .0485491     4.42   0.000     .1195352    .3098633
     diconsa |  -.0492493   .0340345    -1.45   0.148    -.1159625    .0174639
    min_dist |   -.004317   .0005916    -7.30   0.000    -.0054767   -.0031573
    dist_cap |  -.0016174   .0004076    -3.97   0.000    -.0024163   -.0008185
      wm_jor |   .0184417   .0014889    12.39   0.000     .0155232    .0213601
      wm_obr |  -.0013798   .0014169    -0.97   0.330    -.0041573    .0013976
      wm_emp |   .0053482   .0020486     2.61   0.009     .0013325    .0093639
      ww_jor |   .0041728   .0010202     4.09   0.000     .0021732    .0061725
      ww_obr |   .0075212   .0028401     2.65   0.008     .0019541    .0130882
      ww_emp |  -.0004179   .0026306    -0.16   0.874    -.0055743    .0047384
      state2 |  -.2151774   .0626281    -3.44   0.001    -.3379385   -.0924162
      state3 |  -1.639926   .0849079   -19.31   0.000    -1.806359   -1.473493
      state4 |  -.4566485   .0677968    -6.74   0.000    -.5895413   -.3237558
      state5 |  -1.238269   .1115501   -11.10   0.000    -1.456925   -1.019612
      state6 |  -.5925511   .0725991    -8.16   0.000    -.7348571   -.4502451
      state7 |  -.6433101   .0716825    -8.97   0.000    -.7838193   -.5028008
         pop |   .0003203   .0000637     5.03   0.000     .0001956    .0004451
     noedu_m |  -.0548639   .0387558    -1.42   0.157    -.1308316    .0211037
  lprimary_m |   .0510007   .0271891     1.88   0.061    -.0022942    .1042957
   primary_m |   .2152189   .0285273     7.54   0.000     .1593007    .2711371
 secondary_m |   .4475293   .0374614    11.95   0.000     .3740989    .5209597
      msec_m |   .6552171   .0708858     9.24   0.000     .5162695    .7941647
     noedu_f |   .0162013   .0320307     0.51   0.613     -.046584    .0789866
  lprimary_f |   .2925996   .0299117     9.78   0.000     .2339678    .3512315
   primary_f |   .5317261   .0303584    17.51   0.000     .4722187    .5912334
 secondary_f |   .6431403   .0414814    15.50   0.000     .5618301    .7244505
      msec_f |   1.031823   .0920198    11.21   0.000     .8514497    1.212197
     child16 |  -.0111343   .0078394    -1.42   0.156    -.0265007    .0042322
        m55p |  -.1283126   .0492658    -2.60   0.009    -.2248816   -.0317437
        f55p |   .2257019   .0382197     5.91   0.000     .1507852    .3006187
    transfer |   .0001378   .0000319     4.32   0.000     .0000752    .0002003
       _cons |  -1.223682   .1369491    -8.94   0.000    -1.492124   -.9552394
------------------------------------------------------------------------------